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Abstract
I investigate optimal monetary policy in the sticky information model of price ad-
justment within a New Keynesian macroeconomic framework. The model is solved for
optimal policy, and welfare implications of three alternative monetary policy regimes:
unconstrained policy, price-level targeting and inflation targeting, are compared when
there is a shock to the economy. The results for a cost-push shock illustrate that optimal
policy depends on the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of the shock. Infla-
tion targeting is the optimal policy if prices are flexible enough or the shock is persistent
enough. However, for a demand shock, inflation targeting emerges as the best policy for
all values of the price stickiness and the shock’s persistence. When the volatility of nomi-
nal interest rate is taken into consideration, the results indicate that inflation targeting is
the best policy, in the sense that it results in smaller welfare loss and volatility of nominal
interest rate, if prices are sticky enough and the persistence of the shock is large enough.
However, price-level targeting might be preferable to inflation targeting if prices are more
flexible and the relative weight for the volatility of nominal interest rate is large.
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1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that objective of any monetary policy is to achieve a low expected
value of a discounted loss function. To be able to evaluate alternative policy rules, this
loss function, which depends on the model’s specification, needs to be specified. Currently,
there is wide consensus on the central banks’ objectives of keeping inflation close to zero and
output close to its natural level. However, there is a considerable disagreement on the details
of this general specification, such as what would be the relative weights of the output gap and
inflation terms in the loss function and which price stabilization policy should be pursued:
price-level targeting or inflation targeting.
This paper investigates optimal monetary policy for a closed economy within a New Key-
nesian macroeconomic framework with the sticky information model of price adjustment.
This price setting model is proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002). The main premise of their
model is that information about macroeconomic conditions spreads slowly throughout the
population; although prices are set every period, information collecting and processing take
time. The model is solved for optimal policy, and welfare implications of three alternative
monetary policy regimes: unconstrained policy, price-level targeting, and inflation targeting,
are compared when there is a cost-push shock or a demand shock to the economy.1 Uncon-
strained policy regime implies that the central bank does not have commitments or targets
to manipulate the private-sector expectations. However, there is a target level for prices or
inflation in price-level and inflation targeting regimes, and expectations can be manipulated
if the commitment to the target is credible in these regimes.
Despite the common use of the term “targeting”, there is no agreement on the meaning of
it in the literature. In one terminology, such as in Svensson (1997, 2002) or Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999), targeting means minimizing an objective function in which a target variable
shows up. In the other, such as in McCallum and Nelson (1999), targeting means that the
target variable is used in the feedback policy rule. In this study, targeting term is used in
1The cost-push shock appears in price adjustment equations, and represents everything other than the
output gap that may affect the expected marginal costs. It causes model to generate inflation variation
independent of the demand shocks, as observed in data.
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the spirit of the first definition.
Targeting regimes have become the most common type of monetary policies in developed
countries in recent years.2 Inflation targeting has been adopted by many central banks for the
conduct of monetary policy. Svensson and Woodford (2003) show that inflation targeting is
an effective mean of maintaining low and stable inflation and inflation expectations, without
negative consequences for the output gap. Price-level targeting, which may be thought of
as an extreme version of inflation targeting, is also discussed in the literature, but has not
received much support. Some problems, as mentioned in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999),
might be that if the price level overshoots its target, the central bank may have to contract
economic activity to return the price level to its target. So, there should be some inflation
below the level implied by the price-level target to return the price level to its target. Under
inflation targeting, bygones are bygones: overshooting of inflation in one year does not require
an inflation level below the target in the following year.3 Also, the net reduction in price
uncertainty under a price-level targeting rule may be small relative to that obtained under
an inflation targeting policy.4 The rationale for targeting regimes might be to guarantee that
monetary policy avoids mistakes easily by identifying a clear nominal anchor for the policy.
There is voluminous literature on optimal policy and targeting regimes. However, there is no
consensus on whether price-level targeting or inflation targeting is preferable.5
The analysis of this study shows that inflation targeting is generally the best policy in the
sense that it results in smaller welfare loss and volatility of nominal interest rate for the sticky
information model. Price-level targeting might be optimal only if prices are flexible enough. If
only the loss function is considered and the volatility of nominal interest rate is not taken into
2There is no agreement on how targeting regimes should be implemented, either by using “targeting rules”,
as studied in a number of papers by Svensson (1997, 2002, 2003), or by using some mechanical instrument
rules, such as Taylor type rules. In those papers, Svensson proposes that inflation targeting is better described
as a commitment to a “targeting rule” rather than following a mechanical instrument rule.
3The main difference between inflation and price-level targeting is that a base drift in the price level is
allowed in inflation targeting.
4Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) show that monetary targeting or nominal GDP targeting is much more
inefficient than inflation targeting, in the sense of inducing more variable inflation and output.
5Among others, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2001, 2002) identifies optimal policy as inflation targeting.
For an open economy, they obtain optimal policy as domestic inflation targeting under discretion and domestic
price-level targeting under commitment. Gali and Monacelli (2002) find domestic inflation targeting is optimal
for a small open economy. Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) find price-level targeting is the optimal policy while
inflation targeting is suboptimal when the sticky information model of price setting is used.
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consideration, inflation targeting generally emerges as the best policy for cost-push shocks
and demand shocks. Price level targeting dominates only if prices are sticky enough and the
shock is not very persistent when there is a cost-push shock to the economy. Optimal policy,
in a similar framework, is also investigated by Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005). They find
price-level targeting to be the optimal policy while inflation targeting is suboptimal.6 This
implies that allowing base drift in the price level is not optimal in their analysis. Therefore,
the findings in this study are in contrast to those in their study. They use a simple quantity
equation to represent the demand side of their model, so the monetary policy instrument in
their approach is money supply. They also do not solve their model explicitly to obtain the
optimal money-supply rule; instead, they obtain reduced form for the price level and interpret
the expected price level as the policy instrument. They first impose the policy constraints on
the price adjustment equation, and then find the welfare losses. However, in this study, first
a general equilibrium model is solved for optimal solution, and then the regime constraints
are imposed on this solution to obtain the welfare implications of these regimes.
In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, the price adjustment equation is the
crucial part for optimal policy and dynamics of output and inflation, since it determines the
specific relationship between the output gap and inflation. In these models, the specific form
of the demand side is generally represented by an IS equation, which relates the nominal
interest rate to output and inflation. Therefore, the nominal interest rate is generally used
as the instrument of monetary policy in these models, which is now a common application
in academia and monetary practice. Interest rate is sometimes taken as a variable to be
stabilized along with the output gap and inflation. Therefore, volatility of interest rate, so
the specific form of the IS equation, may be important to determine the optimal policy or
compare alternative monetary policies.7 Because of such considerations, an expectational IS
equation, which is obtained from the optimization of households in the model, and relates
6Their exact finding is that the strict price-level targeting is optimal to aggregate demand or productivity
shocks, and flexible price-level targeting (price level gradually returns to its target level) is optimal to cost-push
shocks.
7Some theoretical and empirical advantages of interest-rate rules over the other rules including money-
supply rules are illustrated in literature, such as see Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999), Woodford (2003, Chp. 1, 2).
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the interest rate to output and inflation, is used to represent the demand side of the economy
in this study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is briefly out-
lined. In Section 3, utility approximation of welfare is described when the price adjustment
mechanism is based on the sticky information model. The model is solved, and optimal
policy is derived in Section 4. Welfare implications of the alternative policy regimes under
optimal policy for a cost-push shock and a demand shock are investigated in sections 5 and
6, respectively. The results are given in section 7, and section 8 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Households and Firms
The model is a version of the standard New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model
with price rigidities, which has been used extensively for theoretical analysis of monetary
policy.8 Households are assumed to be monopolistically competitive supplier of their labor
to obtain a cost-push shock term in the model. The economy is closed and composed of a
continuum of identical infinitely lived households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of
firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Households supply labor, which is an imperfect substitute of other
labors, purchase consumption goods, and hold bonds. Firms hire labor and specialize in the
production of a single good that is an imperfect substitute of other goods. Since each firm
and household has some monopoly power, the economy is the one having the monopolistic
competitive markets similar to those studied in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Blachard and
Kiyotaki (1987).
Households and firms behave optimally and maximize their utility and profits, respectively.
There is also a financial market in the economy in which households can trade in a range of
securities that is large enough to completely cover all states of nature; that is, complete market
is assumed and the households can insure themselves against idiosyncratic uncertainty.
8See Rotenberg and Woodford (1997), McCallum and Nelson (1999), Gali and Monacelli (2002), Arslan
(2004).
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Households derive utility from composite consumption goods and leisure, and the utility
of household i in period t is given by:
Uit =
C1−σit
1− σ −
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
, (1)
where Cit is a Dixit-Stiglitz type CES aggregator of composite consumption of household i
and is defined over production Cjit of firm j, and Nit is the household i ’s composite labor
supply index and is defined over the labor demand N jit of firm j. These are defined as:
Cit =
(∫ 1
0
(Cjit)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
, (2)
Nit =
(∫ 1
0
(N jit)
ηt−1
ηt dj
) ηt
ηt−1
. (3)
The parameter of risk aversion σ and marginal disutility of labor ϕ are positive. The pa-
rameter ε is the elasticity of substitution among the goods, and ηt is the elasticity of labor
demand, which follows some stochastic process, these two parameters are greater than one
and same across households.
Each household i seeks to maximize the lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUit , (4)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, where β < 1 is the discount factor. The first
order conditions are given by:9
Wt
Pt
=
µwt
µ
CσitN
ϕ
it , (5)
βItEt
{(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ ( Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1 , (6)
where µwt =
ηt
ηt−1 is the optimal wage markup, µ =
ε
ε−1 is the constant price markup, and
Et(Qt,t+1) = I−1t is the price of a riskless one-period bond. The consumption of the household
i can be obtained as:
cit = Etcit+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 + lnβ) , (7)
9A more detailed solution of the model can be found in Arslan (2005)
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where small characters represent the logarithm of those variables. pit = pt−pt−1 is the inflation
rate at period t, and 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
Demand functions for consumption and labor index can also be obtained as:
Cjit =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
Cit , (8)
N jit =
(
Wit
Wt
)−ηt
Nit . (9)
Each firm j produces its specialized product with a linear technology according to the pro-
duction function:
Yjt = AtNjt . (10)
Output is only the function of labor input Njt and aggregate productivity disturbance At.
Firms hire labor, produce and sell their differentiated products in the monopolistically com-
petitive market, and try to minimize their cost of production. Their cost minimization
problem results in:
γt =
2µwt − 1
µwt
Wt/Pt
At
, (11)
where γt is equal to the firm’s real marginal cost. Since technology is constant return to scale,
and shocks are the same across firms, the real marginal cost γt is the same across firms.
In a monopolistically competitive model, it is assumed that each firm knows that its sales
depend on the price of its product. When all purchases are made for private consump-
tion, then the aggregate demand Yt corresponds to the households total consumption index.
Therefore, the demand function can be written from equation (8), in logarithms as:
yjt = yt − ε(pjt − pt) , (12)
where yjt is the log of output produced by firm j, pjt is the log price charged for that product
by firm j, yt is the log aggregate output, and pt is the price index for aggregate consumption.
Firms’ optimal choice of price P ∗jt to maximize profit, given the above demand function,
can be obtained as:
P ∗jt
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Wt/Pt
At
=
µµwt
2µwt − 1
γt . (13)
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This is the standard results in a monopolistic competitive market when all firms are able
to adjust their price in every period; that is, each firm set its optimal price P ∗jt equal to a
markup over its nominal marginal cost Ptγt. By using equation (5), the above expression can
be rewritten as:
P ∗jt
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
µwt
µ
CσitN
ϕ
it
At
= µwt
CσitN
ϕ
it
At
. (14)
Market clearing conditions require that labor demand and supply be equal, that is Nit = Njt,
and consumption should be equal to output, that is Cit = Ct = Yt. Equation (14) can be
written by using the production function in (10) and the demand function in (12) as:
p∗jt = pt +
σ + ϕ
1 + εϕ
yt − 1 + ϕ1 + εϕ at +
logµwt
1 + εϕ
. (15)
When all firms can set their prices freely each period, that is when prices are flexible, all
firms set the same price p∗jt = pt. The natural level of output y
N
t is defined as the level where
prices are flexible and the wage markup is fixed at its steady state value µw. This setup
means that there are no wage markup shocks, and variations in the natural level of output
do not reflect the variations in the wage markup. Therefore, under flexible price equilibrium,
the natural rate of output can be obtained from equation (15) as:
yNt =
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
at − logµ
w
σ + ϕ
. (16)
If it is plugged into (15), the optimal price chosen by the adjusting firm canbe obtained as:
p∗jt = pt + α(yt − yNt ) + ut , (17)
where α and ut are defined as:
α =
σ + ϕ
1 + εϕ
< 1 and ut =
log(µwt /µ
w)
1 + εϕ
.
When equation (7) is aggregated over all households, It can be rewritten in terms of
aggregate output index as:
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 + lnβ) . (18)
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This is the IS equation of the model and when an exogenous AR(1) technology shock process
at = ρaat−1 + ξt is assumed, it can be written in terms of output gap xt = yt − yNt as:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + νt , (19)
where νt = − log βσ −
(1− ρa)(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ at .
2.2. Price Setting
In the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002), prices are set every period,
but information collecting and processing, that is optimal price computing, occur slowly over
time. A randomly selected fraction 1−θ of firms receive complete information about the state
of the economy in each period, and adjust their prices according to this new information,
while the remaining fraction θ of firms adjust their prices according to old information. The
parameter θ measures the degree of price stickiness; a large one shows that few firms gets
new information, so fewer firms adjust their prices, and the expected time between price
adjustments will be longer. Firms that do not adjust their prices will adjust their output
according to demand function of the market. When a firm j sets its price in period t, it will
set it to its optimal expected price according to the last information it has at period t−k as:
pkjt = Et−kp
∗
jt . (20)
Since the new information arrives at the rate of 1−θ, the share of the firms that last adjusted
their plan k periods ago will be (1− θ)θk. Therefore, the price index can be written as:
pt = (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−kp∗jt . (21)
By using p∗jt from equation (17), the sticky information price adjustment equation can be
obtained in terms of prices as:
pt = (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−k(pt + αxt + ut) , (22)
and in terms of inflation as:
pit = φαxt + φut + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1−k(pit + α∆xt +∆ut) , (23)
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where φ = (1− θ)/θ and ut is the cost-push shock term that represents the changes in prices
independent of demand shocks.
3. Welfare and Utility Approximation
3.1. Measuring the Welfare
Welfare is defined as the utility of the representative agent within the model. Such a
utility optimization based welfare criterion is useful when comparing the consequences of
alternative policy rules. Woodford (2001) shows that this approach can justify the traditional
assumption of price stability, which assumes a quadratic loss function in some form. Also, a
precise formulation of the appropriate loss function can be derived in this approach depending
upon the model’s assumption, especially upon the specification of the price adjustment.
Woodford (2001) shows that quadratic approximation to the utility function of households
in a monopolistically competitive framework can be expressed as:
Ut =
1
2
[
λ(xt − x∗)2 + vari(pi − pt)
]
, (24)
where x∗ is the efficient level of output gap,10 pi is the price of differentiated goods, and pt is
the general price level. This representation is valid for any specification of price stickiness.11
In a New Keynesian framework with price adjustment based on the Calvo (1983) model,
this utility function takes the familiar form of
Ut =
1
2
[
λ(xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
. (25)
So, when x∗ is assumed to be exogenous, then the objective function of the monetary policy
can be expressed as:
max − 1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βi(λx2t+i + pi
2
t+i)
}
, (26)
where λ represent the relative weight on output gap. Since this objective function takes
potential output as the target, it also implicitly takes zero as the target inflation. Much of the
10The level of output gap when there is no distortion such as due to taxes or market power.
11See Woodford (1999, 2001), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
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literature a priori assumed the monetary policy objective as above. In such a representation
the problem is what the relative weight of output and inflation losses should be. There is
no specific answer to this, but there is widespread agreement that the primary objective of
monetary policy should be to control inflation. Therefore, the weight of inflation loss should
be much greater than that of output.
3.2. Welfare for the Sticky Information Model
The utility-based welfare criterion is the level of expected utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt , (27)
approximated around the equilibrium point, where there are no real disturbances. Ut is the
period utility function for any household and is given by equation (1). The period utility
function Ut can be approximated as:12
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t σ + ϕ2
[
x2t +
ε−1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
varj (yjt − yt)
]
+ t.i.p. , (28)
where xt is the output gap, y¯t is the equilibrium point around which the approximation takes
place, and t.i.p term represents the terms independent of policy.
The demand function given in equation (12) gives:
varj (yjt − yt) = ε2varj (pjt − pt) .
If this expression is used in equation (28), then utility function becomes:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t σ + ϕ2
[
x2t +
ε(1 + εϕ)
σ + ϕ
varj (pjt − pt)
]
+ t.i.p. (29)
This is the quadratic approximation to the period utility function and is valid for any model
with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. It shows that policy should aim to
stabilize the output gap and reduce price variability. However, the relation between price
variability and stabilization of the general price level depends on the price adjustment mech-
anism. Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) show that the cross-sectional price variability for the
12Details of the welfare approximation procedure are given in Appendix A, see also Woodford (2001,2002),
Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005).
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sticky information model of price adjustment can be expressed as:
varj (pjt − pt) =
∞∑
i=1
ηi(pt −Et−ipt)2 , (30)
where ηi =
θi(1−θ)
(1−θi)(1−θi+1) . It demonstrates that the variance of relative prices depends upon
the quadratic deviations of the price level from the levels expected at all past dates. Only
unexpected components of the price level relative to past expectations affect the equilibrium
price variability. This relationship can be rewritten in terms of inflation rate as:
varj (pjt − pt) =
∞∑
i=1
ηi
(
i−1∑
l=0
(pit−l −Et−ipit−l)
)2
, (31)
Thus, the equilibrium price variability depends upon the sum of squared deviations of inflation
rates from any past periods to any period t, and only unexpected components of the inflation
rates at all previous periods are matters for the equilibrium price variability.
Therefore, the quadratic approximation to the utility of the representative agent, by ig-
noring t.i.p., is given in terms of prices as:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t ε(1 + εϕ)2
[
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi(pt −Et−ipt)2
]
, (32)
and in terms of inflation as:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t ε(1 + εϕ)2
[
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi
( i−1∑
l=0
(pit−l −Et−ipit−l)
)2]
, (33)
where λ = σ+ϕε(1+εϕ) is the relative weight of the output gap.
4. Optimal Policy
The sticky information Phillips curve proposed in Mankiw and Reis (2002) is given in
terms of prices and inflation in equations (22) and (23), respectively. The IS curve of the
model is given in equation (19) and can be rewritten in terms of prices as:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpt+1 + pt) + νt . (34)
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Since the terms at the outside of the parenthesis in the period utility function (32) do not
affect the optimization problem, they can be dropped. So, the intertemporal loss function
can be written in terms of prices as:
−1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi(pt − Et−ipt)2
)
, (35)
Optimal monetary policy will be choosing xt, pt, and it, which maximizes the objective func-
tion (35) subject to the sticky information Phillips curve (22) and the IS curve (34). In the
first step of the optimization, I maximize (35) subject to (22) and get a relationship between
xt and pt, then optimum it implied by the IS equation (34) can be obtained.
The first step of this optimization problem yields the optimality condition, which relates
xt and pt as:
xt = −Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηi(pt − Et−ipt) = −ΩNpt +Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηiEt−ipt , (36)
where Ω = α(1−θ)θλ and N =
∑∞
i=1 ηi .
This optimality condition is valid for both discretionary and commitment cases of mone-
tary policy. Discretionary policy implies that a central bank optimizes (35) period by period
without any commitment, therefore it is not able to manipulate the private sector expec-
tations. However, commitment to a policy implies the global optimization of (35) under a
specific commitment, which affects private-sector expectations. In both cases, expectations
are predetermined, and are taken as given; therefore, both of the period by period and global
optimizations of (35) yield the same optimality condition given by equation (36).
In this study, I investigate optimal policy under discretion, in the sense that a central
bank optimizes its objective function each period. However, this central bank can make
some commitments to manipulate the expectations of the private sector. This approach also
is in accord with today’s modern central banking practice. Optimal policies for a cost-push
shock and a demand shock are investigated under three policy regimes. First, unconstrained
optimal monetary policy is investigated. A central bank optimizes without any commitments
to manipulate private-sector expectations with this policy, so those expectations are free
to change. In the other two policy regimes, the central bank makes commitments to affect
12
the expectations, and targets some level of prices or inflation, so these regimes might be
interpreted as the ones under commitment, although optimization takes place each period.13
5. Optimal Policy for a Cost-Push Shock
5.1. Unconstrained Policy with a Cost-Push Shock
Monetary policy does not have any announced target or credible commitment to manip-
ulate private-sector expectations in this case. Therefore, the central bank maximizes the
objective function (35) without any constraint on private-sector expectations, and they are
free to change. The optimality condition for this regime is represented by equation (36). The
sticky information Phillips curve (22) can be rewritten as:
pt = (1− θ)(pt + αxt + ut) + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−k(pt + αxt + ut) . (37)
If the optimality condition given by equation (36) is substituted into (37) to get rid of xt,
one can obtain:
pt(1− (1− θ) + α(1− θ)ΩN) = (1− θ)ut + α(1− θ)Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηiEt−ipt
+ (1− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−k
[
pt + α
(
− ΩNpt +Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηiEt−ipt
)
+ ut
]
. (38)
It is also assumed that the cost-push shock term ut is an AR(1) process and is given by
ut = ρut−1 + εt, where εt is the white noise. It can be expressed as an infinite moving
average form as ut =
∑∞
i=0 ρ
iεt−i. If pt is represented by pt =
∑∞
i=0 γiεt−i, equation (38)
can be solved by the method of undetermined coefficients. To find pt, the coefficients γi
are obtained in terms of the correlation coefficient ρ of the cost-push shock. These serial
correlation coefficients γk of prices for any k are obtained as:
γk =
Υk
Λ−Ψk , (39)
13The central bank commits to a “targeting rule” in the terminology of Svensson, but implementation of
this rule is discretionary.
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where Υk = ρk
∑k
i=0 θ
i, Λ = (θ + α(1− θ)ΩN)/(1− θ), and
Ψk = αΩ
k∑
i=1
ηi + (1− αΩN)
k∑
i=1
θi + αΩ
( k∑
i=1
ηi
)( k∑
i=1
θi
)
.
In expression (39), both the numerator and denominator approach to zero when k ap-
proaches infinity. The convergence of the terms Υk and Λ − Ψk depends on the values of ρ
and θ, respectively. Therefore, an optimal solution for the price path depends on the con-
vergence speed of these terms. If ρ is larger than a critical value for any given θ, then the
numerator term Υk converges to zero more slowly than the denominator term Λ−Ψk; there-
fore, the solution to γk diverges, and a bounded solution cannot be obtained. A bounded
solution requires that ρ is smaller than this critical value, which implies the faster convergence
of Υk to zero than Λ−Ψk.
When a solution to the price path is found, the output gap can be obtained from the
optimality condition represented in equation (36). By expressing the output gap as an infinite
MA process, xt =
∑∞
i=0 βiεt−i, and substituting it into (36), one can obtain:
∞∑
i=0
βiεt−i = −ΩN
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i +Ω
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
i=j
ηjγiεt−i . (40)
The coefficients βk for any k can be obtained from this expression by the method of unde-
termined coefficients as:
βk = −ΩNγk +Ωγk
k∑
i=1
ηi . (41)
Optimal nominal interest rate it can be found from the IS equation:
it = σ(Etxt+1 − xt) + Etpt+1 − pt ,
by using the solutions to the output gap and prices. If it is expressed as it =
∑∞
i=0 φiεt−i,
then the serial correlation coefficients φk for any k can be found by:
φk = σ(βk+1 − βk) + γk+1 − γk . (42)
Having the output gap and prices, the welfare loss of the model under unconstrained
14
optimal policy can be calculated from equation (35) as:
Welfare Loss = −E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi(pt − Et−ipt)2
)
,
= −
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi
( i−1∑
k=0
γkεt−k
)2]
. (43)
5.2. Price-level Targeting with a Cost-Push Shock
In this subsection, the optimal policy for a cost-push shock is investigated under price-
level targeting regime. In this regime, monetary authority commits to keep the price level
constant and takes actions to return the price level to its steady state value after a shock
occurs. Since it is assumed that the central bank has a credible commitment to a targeting
regime, it can manipulate the private-sector expectations. Therefore, the expectations about
the price level under the price-level targeting regime satisfy:14
Et−ipt = 0 . (44)
Under the price-level targeting, the optimality condition (36) reduces to:
xt = −Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηi pt = −ΩNpt . (45)
So the price adjustment equation (22) becomes:
pt =
(1− θ)
θ + (1− θ)αΩN
[
ut +
∞∑
k=1
θk
∞∑
i=k
ρiεt−i
]
. (46)
Let pt =
∑∞
i=0 γiεt−i, then the coefficients γk for any k can be found by the method of
undetermined coefficients from equation (46) and are given by:
γk =
(1− θ)
θ + (1− θ)αΩN ρ
k
k∑
i=0
θi . (47)
The output gap can be obtained from equation (45) as:
xt =
−ΩN(1− θ)
θ + (1− θ)αΩN
[
ut +
∞∑
k=1
θk
∞∑
i=k
ρiεt−i
]
. (48)
14It is assumed here that the target price level is normalized to be 1.
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If it is assumed that xt =
∑∞
i=0 βiεt−i, then the coefficients βk for any k can be found as:
βk =
−ΩN(1− θ)
θ + (1− θ)αΩN ρ
k
k∑
i=0
θk. (49)
The nominal interest rate it can be obtained from the IS equation. If it =
∑∞
i=0 φiεt−i, then
the coefficients φk for any k are given by:
φk = σ(βk+1 − βk) + γk+1 − γk . (50)
The welfare loss can be calculated after obtaining the output gap and prices. Therefore,
the loss function given in equation (35) takes the following form under the price-level targeting
Welfare Loss = −
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi p
2
t
)
= −
∞∑
t=0
βt(λx2t +Np
2
t ) . (51)
5.3. Inflation Targeting with a Cost-Push Shock
Optimal policy under inflation targeting regime is investigated in this subsection. In this
regime, the monetary authority commits to maintain a stable inflation level around zero. Any
base drift in price level is allowed. Because of the central bank’s credible commitment to the
inflation target, the private-sector expectations about inflation are preset, and do not change
when a temporary shock hits the economy. Therefore, expectations about the inflation under
inflation targeting regime satisfy:
Et−ipit = 0 . (52)
When the variable of interest is inflation, the intertemporal loss function given in equation
(35) can be rewritten in terms of inflation as:
−1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi
( i−1∑
l=0
(pit−l −Et−ipit−l)
)2]
. (53)
Optimality condition (36) can be written in terms of inflation by using equation (31) as:
xt = −Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηi
i−1∑
k=0
(pit−k −Et−ipit−k) .
Under inflation targeting, this expression reduces to:
xt = −Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηi
i−1∑
k=0
pit−k , (54)
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and the Phillips curve in equation (23) can be rewritten as:
pit = φα
(
−Ω
∞∑
i=1
ηi
i−1∑
k=0
pit−k
)
+φut+(1−θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1−k
(
∆ut−αΩ
∞∑
k=1
ηk (pit−pit−k
)
. (55)
Let pit =
∑∞
i=0 γiεt−i, then equation (55) can be solved to obtain the inflation path by
finding the coefficients γk for any k. These coefficients are obtained from the following ex-
pression:
γk(1 + αφΩN) = −αφΩN
k−1∑
i=0
γi + αφΩ
k−1∑
i=0
γi
k−i∑
j=1
ηj + (1− θ)αΩN
k−1∑
i=0
γiθ
k−1−i
− (1− θ)αΩθ
k−2∑
i=0
γiθ
k−2−i
k−1−i∑
j=1
ηj + φρk + (ρ− 1)ρk−1
k−1∑
i=0
θi. (56)
Once the inflation is obtained, the output gap can be found from equation (54). If xt =∑∞
i=0 βiεt−i, then the serial correlation coefficients βk for any k are given by:
βk = −Ω
k∑
i=0
γk
(
N −
k−i∑
j=1
ηj
)
. (57)
The nominal interest rate it can be obtained from the IS equation, and if it =
∑∞
i=0 φiεt−i,
then the coefficients φk for any k are given by:
φk = σ(βk+1 − βk) + γk+1 . (58)
Having inflation and the output gap, the welfare loss under the inflation targeting can be
calculated from (53) as:
Welfare Loss = −
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λx2t +
∞∑
i=1
ηi
( i−1∑
k=0
pit−k
)2]
. (59)
6. Optimal Policy for a Demand Shock
Disturbances in the demand side of the economy are represented by a random process νt
in IS equation (34). These disturbances basically come from technological shocks as shown
in equation (19). The random technological process in the economy is assumed to be at =
ρaat−1 + εt, and can be expressed as at =
∑∞
i=0 ρ
i
aεt−i. If a demand shock occurs when the
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economy is in the steady state, a central bank can stabilize the economy under any regime
by trying to neutralize the effect of the shock by changing the nominal interest rates.
When a demand shock occurs, it first affects the potential output as can be seen from
equation (16); the output gap changes in opposite direction due to this change in potential
output. In our framework, dynamic implications of a demand shock can be found by finding
price paths for the above changes in the output gap by using the sticky information Phillips
curve. The optimal output can be obtained by using the optimality condition in (36). After
having prices and the output gap, optimal path for nominal interest rate can be found through
the IS equation.
6.1. Unconstrained Policy with a Demand Shock
This is the same policy regime described above for the cost-push shock, except that a
demand shock occurs when the economy is in the steady state. When a shock occurs, it
changes the potential output given by equation (16), then the change in the output gap is
given by:
xt = − 1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
at = − 1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
∞∑
i=0
ρiaεt−i . (60)
When there is no supply shock, the sticky information Phillips curve given by equation
(22) can be written as:
pt =
α(1− θ)
θ
xt +
1− θ
θ
∞∑
k=1
θk Et−kpt +
α(1− θ)
θ
∞∑
k=1
θk Et−kxt . (61)
If the infinite moving average representation of prices, which is pt =
∑∞
i=0 γiεt−i, and the
output gap expression given in equation (60) are used, equation (61) can be rewritten as:
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i = Z
∞∑
i=0
ρiaεt−i +
1− θ
θ
∞∑
k=1
θk
∞∑
i=k
γiεt−i + Z
∞∑
k=1
θk
∞∑
i=k
ρiaεt−i , (62)
where Z = −α(1− θ)
θ
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ . Therefore, the serial correlation coefficients γk of prices for
any k can be found by the method of undetermined coefficients as:
γk = Z
(ρa
θ
)k k∑
i=0
θi. (63)
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This expression implies a bounded solution only if ρa < θ, otherwise the solution diverges.
If xt =
∑∞
i=0 βiεt−i, then the serial correlation coefficients βk can be found by using the
optimality condition in (36) as:
βk = −ΩNγk +Ωγk
k∑
i=1
ηi . (64)
The optimal nominal interest rate it can be found from the IS equation:
it = σ(Etxt+1 − xt) + Etpt+1 − pt + σ νt . (65)
The disturbance term νt in this IS equation results from the technological process at, and it
is obtained from equation (19) as:
νt = −Qat = −Q
∞∑
i=0
ρiaεt−i , (66)
where Q = (1− ρa)(1 + ϕ)σ + ϕ .
If it is expressed as it =
∑∞
i=0 φiεt−i, then the serial correlation coefficients φk for any k are
given by:
φk = σ(βk+1 − βk) + γk+1 − γk − σQρka . (67)
The welfare loss of the model under unconstrained optimal policy for a demand shock can
also be calculated from equation (35) after having prices and the output gap. The expression
for the welfare loss is the same expression for the case of cost-push shock, and it is given by
equation (43).
6.2. Price-level Targeting with a Demand Shock
This is also the same regime described above for the cost-push shock, where monetary
authority commits to keep the price level unchanged. Therefore, in such a regime, the private-
sector expectations take the form of Et−ipt = 0, and the same optimality condition given in
equation (45) for the cost-push shock is still valid here.
In this case the price adjustment equation (22) becomes:
pt = (1− θ)(pt + αxt) + α(1− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θk Et−kxt . (68)
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If the output gap expression in equation (60) and pt =
∑∞
i=0 γiεt−i are used, the above price
equation in (68) can be written as:
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i = Z
∞∑
i=0
ρiaεt−i + Z
∞∑
k=1
θk
∞∑
i=k
ρiaεt−i . (69)
From this equation, the coefficients γk for any k can be found by the method of undetermined
coefficients as:
γk = Z ρka
k∑
i=0
θi . (70)
After having coefficients γk, the serial correlation coefficients of the output gap and nominal
interest rate, βk and φk respectively, can be obtained as:
βk = −ΩN γk , (71)
φk = σ(βk+1 − βk) + γk+1 − γk − σQρka . (72)
The loss function takes the same form as the one for the case of the cost-push shock, and
is given by equation (51).
6.3. Inflation Targeting with a Demand Shock
In this regime, expectations about the inflation satisfy Et−i = 0 as explained above for
the cost-push shock case, and the optimality condition is the same given in equation (54).
Under this monetary policy regime, the sticky information Phillips curve in equation (23)
takes the form of
pit = φαxt + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1−k∆xt , (73)
and ∆xt can be calculated by using equation (60) as:
∆xt = − 1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
(at − at−1) = − 1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
∞∑
i=0
ρia(εt−i − εt−1−i) . (74)
If inflation is expressed as pit =
∑∞
i=0 γiεt−i, equation (73) can be rewritten by using the
expressions for xt and ∆xt in equations (60) and (74), respectively, as:
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i = Z
∞∑
i=0
ρiaεt−i−QZ
∞∑
k=0
(θρa)kεt−1−k+QZ
∞∑
k=0
θk
∞∑
i=k+1
ρia(εt−i−εt−1−i) . (75)
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This equation can be solved to obtain a solution to inflation by finding the coefficients γk for
any k, and this solution is given by:
γk = Z ρka −QZ(ρk−1a − ρka)
k−1∑
i=0
θi . (76)
Once the coefficients γk of inflation are obtained, the serial correlation coefficients of the
output gap and nominal interest rate, βk and φk respectively, can be obtained as:
βk = −Ω
k∑
i=0
γk
(
N −
k−i∑
j=1
ηj
)
, (77)
φk = σ(βk+1 − βk) + γk+1 − σQρka . (78)
The welfare loss function can be calculated after having the output gap and inflation.
Again, it takes the same form as the one for the case of the cost-push shock, and is given by
equation (59).
7. Simulations and Results
Model parameters are calibrated as elasticity of substitution among goods, ε = 6; risk
aversion factor, which is also the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption, σ = 1; marginal disutility of labor, ϕ = 1.25; and discount factor β = 0.99. In
literature, especially there is no consensus on the value of parameter σ and there are different
estimations on this parameter.15 My calibration of the parameters σ and ϕ is the same as in
Chari et al. (2000).16
7.1. Results for a Cost-push shock
The dynamic paths of the output gap, price level, inflation and nominal interest rate are
given for ρ = 0.8 and ρ = 0.4 when θ = 0.85 in Figure 1. The figure shows that price
level converges back to its target level under unconstrained policy and price-level targeting
15See Arslan (2005) for a review of different estimation of σ.
16In Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005), the parameters α given in equation (17) is taken as 0.1; with my
calibration this parameter is around 0.25 in my study. They also make their analysis just for one value of
parameter θ, which is 0.25.
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Figure 1: Optimal policy impulse responses to a unit cost-push shock when θ = 0.85.
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regimes, while there is a base drift in price level, and inflation returns to its target level under
inflation targeting. The output gap decreases while price level and inflation increase at the
beginning, and then they all return to their steady-state values. Inflation overshoots in all
policy regimes and the sizes of these overshoots increase when the persistence of the shock
decreases; however, output gap overshoots only in inflation targeting. It can also be seen that
fluctuations in the nominal interest rate increase when the shock becomes less persistent. This
figure also illustrates that the persistence of the variables depends on the persistence of the
shock term. However, these impulse responses do not say much about which policy is better,
so the welfare implications of these alternative policy regimes need to be investigated.
The welfare implications of the policy regimes are given in Figure 2. The panels show
the sensitivity of welfare losses to the persistence of the shock for different values of θ in
alternative policy regimes. Since there are no bounded solution for some values of θ and ρ,
loss functions diverge for these cases as shown in the figure. Figure 2 illustrates that losses
are similar in unconstrained policy and price-level targeting regimes, especially when prices
are stickier. The loss in inflation targeting regime behaves similar to them when θ values are
low, however it is steady and somewhat increasing function of ρ until it becomes very close
to one for higher θ values. These graphs illustrate that the best policy depends on the values
of the parameters θ and ρ, which are the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of the
cost-push shock, respectively. Inflation targeting is the best policy when prices become more
flexible, that is when θ is small. However, when prices become stickier, that is for large values
of θ, best policy depends on the persistence of the shock, and unconstrained policy and price-
level targeting dominate inflation targeting when the shock is not very persistent, that is ρ
is less than some threshold value. Therefore, it can be concluded that inflation targeting is
the best policy and dominates the other regimes in the sense that it results in smaller welfare
loss when prices are more flexible or the shock is persistent. However, price-level targeting
dominates inflation targeting when prices become stickier and shock is not very persistent.
In the framework here, a central bank tries to stabilize the economy with interest-rate
instrument, and the loss function involves the output gap and price level (or inflation) terms
without giving any attention to the variability of nominal interest rate. However, some
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of welfare loss to the persistence of the cost-push shock.
empirical and theoretical literature take the interest rate as another variable to be stabilized.
In such a case, either policy rule is updated by taking the interest rate smoothing into account,
or a term is added to the loss function to penalize the deviations of interest rate from the
target level.17 Therefore, it makes sense also to investigate the variability of nominal interest
rate in alternative policy regimes. Figure 1 shows the optimal nominal interest rate responses
under these regimes. One can see from these responses that nominal interest rate volatility is
largest in inflation targeting, while smallest in unconstrained policy regimes, and somewhere
17See, for example, Woodford (2003, Chp. 6).
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Figure 3: Standard deviations of optimal nominal interest rates for a cost-push shock.
between these two in price-level targeting.
However, volatility of nominal interest rates in alternative policy regimes might be better
illustrated when the standard deviations of optimal nominal interest rate across the policy
regimes are drawn for different levels of price stickiness while ρ changes as in Figure 3. Since
there are no bounded solutions for unconstrained policy regime for some parameter values,
standard deviations of nominal interest rate diverge in these cases. As shown in top two
panels of the figure, when prices are sticky, the lowest standard deviations are implied by un-
constrained policy and price-level targeting regimes until the shock becomes very persistent.
The standard deviation in inflation targeting regime decreases and approaches the others
when ρ increases. However, when prices are not sticky enough as shown in the bottom two
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panels of the figure, price-level targeting has the lowest standard deviations. Therefore, if the
volatility of the interest rate is included into the analysis, one may conclude that inflation
targeting is the best policy in the sense that it results in smaller welfare loss and variability of
nominal interest rate only when prices are sticky enough and the persistence of the cost-push
shock is large and close to one. However, when prices are more flexible, price-level targeting
might be preferable to the inflation targeting only if the relative weight of the stability of
nominal interest rate is large.
7.2. Results for a Demand shock
The dynamic paths of the output gap, price level, inflation and nominal interest rate are
shown in Figure 4 when there is a positive demand shock to the economy. The figure shows
that there is a base drift in price level under inflation targeting regime. The output gap
increases and price level or inflation decreases after the shock, and then they all return to
their steady-state values. Similar to the cost-push shock case, fluctuations in nominal interest
rate increase when the shock becomes less persistent. Again, to be able to choose the best
policy for a demand shock, the welfare implications of the alternative policy regimes need
to be compared. The welfare losses under policy regimes are given in Figure 5. This figure
shows that inflation targeting regime produces less welfare loss than the other two regimes
for all values of ρ.
Similar to the case of the cost-push shock, the volatility of nominal interest rate in al-
ternative policy regimes needs be investigated for a unit demand shock. Although Figure 4
illustrates the impulse responses of nominal interest rate, relative volatilities in alternative
policy regimes might be better illustrated if the standard deviations of optimal nominal in-
terest rate across the policy regimes are plotted for different levels of price stickiness while ρ
changes as in Figure 6. Since there are no bounded solutions in unconstrained policy regime
for some parameter values, the standard deviations of nominal interest rate diverge in these
cases. As shown in the top two panels of the figure, when prices are sticky, the standard
deviations implied by inflation targeting and price level targeting regimes are very small and
close to each other and decrease when ρ increases. However, when prices are not sticky
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Figure 4: Optimal policy impulse responses to a unit demand shock when θ = 0.85.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of welfare loss to the persistence of the demand shock.
enough as shown in the bottom two panels of the figure, price-level targeting has the lowest
standard deviations.
Therefore, if the volatility of the interest rate is included into the analysis, it may be
concluded that inflation targeting is the best policy in the sense that it results in smaller
welfare loss and reasonable variability of nominal interest rate when prices are sticky enough.
However, when the prices are not very sticky, inflation targeting might not be the best policy
depending on the relative importance of the variability of nominal interest rate with respect
to the variabilities of the output gap and prices. Because, in this case, variability of interest
rate in price-level targeting is less than the one in inflation targeting, so price-level targeting
28
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Figure 6: Standard deviations of optimal nominal interest rates for a demand shock.
might be preferable over inflation targeting regime.
8. Conclusions
In this study, optimal monetary policy for a closed economy within a New Keynesian
macroeconomic model with the sticky information model of price adjustment is investigated.
Specifically, the welfare implications of three alternative monetary policy regimes are com-
pared for a unit cost-push shock and a demand shock. The first one is a discretionary policy
regime in the sense that a central bank optimizes each period without any commitment or
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target to manipulate the private-sector expectation, and it is called unconstrained policy
regime. The second policy regime is price-level targeting in which the central bank still op-
timizes each period, but this time it commits to a targeting rule that puts a specific target
level for prices, so it is able to manipulate the private-sector expectations. The third one
is inflation targeting in which central bank has a specific target level for the inflation rate
rather than prices, so a base drift in price level is allowed. Optimal monetary policy with
the sticky information Phillips curve is also studied by Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005). This
study differs from their study in solving the model for optimal policy and direct comparison
of the welfare losses under the three specific policy regimes. Also, here an IS equation for the
demand side is used, and therefore the nominal interest rate is taken as the policy instrument
The analysis of this study shows that inflation targeting generally is the best policy
in the sense that it results in smaller welfare loss and volatility of nominal interest rate,
which is in contrast with Ball, Mankiw and Reis’s (2005) result. They find price-level
targeting as the optimal policy, while inflation targeting is suboptimal. When the volatility
of nominal interest rate is not taken into consideration, the results for a cost-push shock
show that optimal policy depends on the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of
the shocks. Inflation targeting is the optimal policy if prices are flexible enough or the
shock is persistent enough. For a demand shock, inflation targeting emerges as the best
policy for all values of the price stickiness and the shock’s persistence. When the volatility
of nominal interest rate is taken into consideration, the results indicate that again inflation
targeting is generally the best policy for both the cost-push shocks and demand shocks,
in the sense that it results in smaller welfare loss and volatility of nominal interest rate.
However, price-level targeting might be preferable to inflation targeting only if prices are
more flexible and the relative weight for the volatility of nominal interest rate is large enough.
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Appendix
A. Quadratic Approximation to Welfare
The welfare is defined as the total utility of households in the model and given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt , (A.1)
where Ut is the period utility function for any households given in equation (1). This can be
approximated around the equilibrium point where there are no real disturbances. Under the
equilibrium with no real disturbances, real marginal cost is given by:18
γt =
2µw − 1
µµw
≡ 1− Φy , (A.2)
where Φy = µµ
w−2µw+1
µµw , µ is the constant markup resulting from firms’ market power, and
µw is the wage markup with no shocks resulting from households’ labor market power. So
in equation (A.2), I can interpret that Φy summarizes the all distortions in the equilibrium
as a results of frictions in the markets. Since real marginal cost γt equals to one for efficient
level of output Y ∗, Φy can be taken very close to zero to obtain an approximation around
the equilibrium, which is very close to efficient level. Such a situation can be obtained if it is
assumed µ = µw = 1, then the equilibrium point from equation (16) will be:
y¯t =
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
a¯t . (A.3)
Under equilibrium condition, and given the aggregate production function, the period utility
function can be expressed as:
Ut =
e(1−σ)yt
1− σ −
∫ 1
0
e(1+ϕ)(yjt−at)
1 + ϕ
dj . (A.4)
The quadratic Taylor-series approximation of the first term on the right around the equilib-
rium value y¯t is given by:
e(1−σ)yt
1− σ =
e(1−σ)y¯t
1− σ + e
(1−σ)y¯t(yt − y¯t) + 12(1− σ)e
(1−σ)y¯t(yt − y¯t)2
=
e(1−σ)y¯t
1− σ + e
(1−σ)y¯t
[
(yt − y¯t) + 12(1− σ)(yt − y¯t)
2
]
. (A.5)
18See equation (13) in the text.
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The second term can be approximated as:∫ 1
0
e1+ϕ)(yjt−at)
1 + ϕ
dj =
∫ 1
0
[
e1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)
1 + ϕ
+ e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)(yjt − y¯t)− e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)(at − a¯t)
+
1
2
e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)(1 + ϕ)(yjt − y¯t)2 + 12e
(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)(at − a¯t)2
− e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)(1 + ϕ)(yjt − y¯t)(at − a¯t)
]
dj . (A.6)
If yˆt = yt − y¯t, aˆt = at − a¯t, yˆjt = yjt − y¯jt, and t.i.p. is the terms independent of policy, the
period utility in (A.4) can be written as:
Ut = e(1−σ)y¯t
(
yˆt+
1
2
(1−σ)yˆ2t
)−e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t) ∫ 1
0
[
yˆjt+
1 + ϕ
2
yˆ2jt−(1+ϕ)yˆjtaˆt
]
dj+t.i.p.
Ut = e(1−σ)y¯t
(
yˆt +
1
2
(1− σ)yˆ2t
)− e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)[Ej yˆjt + 1 + ϕ2 (varj yˆjt
+(Ej yˆjt)2)− (1 + ϕ)aˆtEj yˆjt
]
+ t.i.p. , (A.7)
where Ej yˆjt =
∫
yˆjt dj and varj yˆjt are the mean value and the variance of yˆjt across all
goods j at date t, respectively. In the model, Dixit-Stiglitz index of aggregate demand can
be written in terms of output as:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
(Yjt)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
. (A.8)
This expression can be rewritten in log-linear form, and be approximated as a second order
Taylor series expansion around y¯t as:
e
ε−1
ε
yt =
∫ 1
0
e
ε−1
ε
yjtdj
=
∫ 1
0
e
ε−1
ε
y¯tdj +
∫ 1
0
[
ε− 1
ε
e
ε−1
ε
y¯t(yjt − y¯t) + 12
(ε− 1
ε
)2
e
ε−1
ε
y¯t(yjt − y¯t)2
]
dj
= e
ε−1
ε
y¯t +
ε− 1
ε
e
ε−1
ε
y¯t
[ ∫ 1
0
(
yˆjt +
1
2
ε− 1
ε
yˆ2jt
)
dj
]
= e
ε−1
ε
y¯t
[
1 +
ε− 1
ε
(
Ej yˆjt +
1
2
ε− 1
ε
Ej yˆ
2
jt
)]
. (A.9)
Since varj yˆjt = Ej yˆ2jt − (Ej yˆjt)2, expression (A.9) can be written as:
ε− 1
ε
yˆt = log
[
1 +
ε− 1
ε
(
Ej yˆjt +
1
2
ε− 1
ε
(varj yˆjt + (Ej yˆjt)2)
)]
. (A.10)
34
When yt is close enough to y¯t, as expected, the above expression can be approximated as:
yˆt = Ej yˆjt +
1
2
ε− 1
ε
varj yˆjt . (A.11)
If this expression is used in the period utility function (A.7) to eliminate the Ej yˆjt terms,
and then some small terms are ignored, one can obtain:
Ut = e(1−σ)y¯t
(
yˆt +
1
2
(1− σ)yˆ2t
)− e(1+ϕ)(y¯t−a¯t)[
yˆt +
1 + ϕ
2
yˆ2t +
ε−1 + ϕ
2
varj yˆjt − (1 + ϕ)yˆtaˆt
]
+ t.i.p. (A.12)
This equation can be rewritten by using equation (A.3) as:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t σ + ϕ2
[
yˆ2t −
2(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
aˆtyˆt +
ε−1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
varj yˆjt
]
+ t.i.p. (A.13)
It can be written from the natural rate expression and equation (A.3) that:
yˆNt = y
N
t − y¯t =
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
aˆt , (A.14)
then by plugging this expression into (A.13), one can get:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t σ + ϕ2
[
yˆ2t − 2yˆNt yˆt +
ε−1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
varj yˆjt
]
+ t.i.p. (A.15)
If −(yˆNt )2 and yˆt (it is constant with respect to j ) terms are added into the t.i.p. and into
the variance of the above equation, respectively, (A.15) can be rewritten as:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t σ + ϕ2
[
(yˆt − yˆNt )2 +
ε−1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
varj (yˆjt − yˆt)
]
+ t.i.p. (A.16)
If the hat terms are expended by using their definition, the above expression can be written
as:
Ut = −e(1−σ)y¯t σ + ϕ2
[
x2t +
ε−1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
varj (yjt − yt)
]
+ t.i.p. (A.17)
This is equation (28) given in the text.
35
